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ABSTRACT
The global environmental crisis requires a grasp of how human society interacts
with nature, but also, simultaneously, how the world is divided into multiple
societies. International Relations has a weak grasp of nature treating it as
external to the international – an ‘environment’ to be managed – while
environmentalism has a planetary epistemology that occludes the
significance of the international. How to break this impasse? While neither
Geopolitics nor ‘new materialism’ capture the complex conjuncture of socio-
natural and inter-societal dynamics, I argue that Justin Rosenberg’s
theorization of the international as ‘the consequences of societal multiplicity’
provides a theoretical opening. If a materialist notion of societal is adopted,
‘societal multiplicity’ allows human-natural and international dynamics to be
grasped together. Thus, climate change is not a problem arising exogenously
to the international, but something emerging through international








Features and properties of the natural world have always played a role in world politics. The arrival in
Europe in the fourteenth century of a new microorganism – the Black Death – shrank the rural
labour supply sowing the seeds of social transformations that contributed to the end of feudalism
in Europe (Anievas & Nisancioglu, 2015). The eruption of the Tambora volcano in Indonesia in
1815 resulted in a ‘year without summer’ causing famine, and, it has been said, a global wave of pro-
tectionism and authoritarian government (Wood, 2015). Endemic pollution under Eastern Block
regimes helped undermine their legitimacy and played a role in precipitating the end the Cold
War (Corry, 2014). Today, disappearing Arctic sea-ice due to global warming is opening up new
sea routes creating a whole new strategic arena for Arctic states and great powers.
Despite this, virtually all currently leading theories and approaches in International Relations (IR)
are reticent on the role of ‘the natural’ (variously conceived) in the international itself. For most of
the life of the modern discipline of IR, ‘the environment’ has been ignored or treated as just another
‘issue’ (Smith, 1993, p. 32). Realists may refer to the ‘stopping power of water’ (Mearsheimer, 2001,
p. 84) but when IR theories point out the basic elements and mechanisms of the international system
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itself, in most versions the natural world barely exists. This goes for much existing rationalist as well
as critical IR, between them preoccupied instead with interests, strategies, institutions, win-sets, dis-
courses, identities or – most recently – social practices (Corry, 2017a).
It was not ever so. International Relations as a discipline has some of its strongest roots in the
tradition of Geopolitik that developed in nineteenth century in Europe. This focused on the impor-
tance of geography, drawing also on demography, agricultural economics, technology, and at times
race, and blended these with the EuropeanMachtpolitik tradition. Yet after the SecondWorldWar as
IR was shaped as a distinct social science, natural factors were very deliberately excluded. Hans Mor-
genthau rejected geopolitics as ‘a pseudoscience erecting the factor of geography into an absolute that
is supposed to determine the power, and hence the fate, of nations’ (1948/1985, p. 174). The part of
nature the realists initially kept as endogenous to IR theory was human nature (‘politics is governed
by objective laws that have their roots in human nature’ (Morgenthau 1948/1985, p. 4)), although
structural realism later excluded this element too leaving international politics defined by a social
structure of competing and functionally like units (Waltz, 1979).
Meanwhile precursors to neorealism’s rival, neoliberal institutionalism, e.g. the likes of Karl
Deutsch, emphasized communication and cybernetic interaction as the driver of modern hypercon-
nected world politics. ‘Pluralists’ saw IR firmly within a social science framework, where incentives,
rules, conventions and norms induced disembodied ‘actors’ (state or non-state) to strategize and/or
cooperate. This was a world even further removed from things such as soil, populations, races,
mountain ranges, climates or even economic accumulation and military hardware. As Marxism wea-
kened from an already marginal position, constructivism became the new challenger, but this hardly
helped to reintroduce materiality, let alone nature.
However, excluded from theorizations of the international itself, nature then reappeared in the
1980s in the form of the ‘the environment’ – a category of political challenges linked to human-cen-
tric notions of pollution or resource depletion. Most recently the Earth Systems Governance litera-
ture (e.g. Biermann, 2014) explores the urgent question of how multiple interlinking planetary
systems might be governed by a global architecture of institutions and actors. But as before, nature
remains exogenous to the social processes and institutions that would govern it. In IR, social out-
comes are deemed to have only social causes (Deudney, 1999).
From the other side, popular and scientific framings of nature and climate tend to display a feeble
grasp of the international. They offer instead a globalist focus on Earth Systems, ‘planetary bound-
aries’ (Wijkman & Rockström, 2013), the species as a singular agent/collective victim of existential
risks (Malm & Hornborg, 2014) in the age of the ‘Anthropocene’ – the geological epoch in which
human activity is said to have pushed the planet into a new and perilous state of Earth systems
instability (Steffen, Grinevald, Crutzen, & McNeill, 2011). By invoking homogenizing ‘global objects’
(Hamilton, 2016) these tend to obscure the obvious ‘but surprisingly consequential’ (Rosenberg,
2006, p. 316) fact that the world is divided into multiple polities. Calls have even been heard to delib-
erately dispense with IR and the international: ‘traditional geopolitical thinking is now outdated, and
working within its premises perpetuates habits of mind and modes of policy making that simply
don’t fit’ the ‘new artificial circumstances of the Anthropocene’ (Dalby, 2014, p. 2). The latter are
said to undermine the basic tenets of Westphalian politics (Cudworth & Hobden, 2017; Young,
2016) requiring us to effectively ditch IR, perhaps in favour of ‘Planet Politics’ (Burke, Fishel, Mitch-
ell, Dalby, & Levine, 2016). Outside some World Ecology literatures (e.g. Hornborg & Crumley,
2016), this mutual set of blinkers leaves popular approaches to global ecological issues and inter-
national politics limited effectively to inter-state negotiations about governing environmental issues
as a collective action problem.
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In this article I attempt to ‘bring nature back in’, not because it was ever absent from the inter-
national itself, but because IR as a field, like other social sciences, has abstracted too much from it. I
argue that various forms of new materialism have recently been engaged to rethink the supposedly
sharp boundaries between human and non-human worlds. But collapsing the distinction through
notions of hybridity does not always facilitate understanding the relation between them. Nor does
it help tackle the problem of the international. Justin Rosenberg’s project to define ‘the international’
in positive terms as the set of consequences that arise from the coexistence of multiple societies
(2006, 2016, 2017) provides a way forward, but stops short of thinking through the role of nature
in the international. I first draw on recent reinterpretations of historical materialism arguing that
human societies are necessarily and always in a ‘metabolism’with the natural world. Nature is under-
stood neither as something pristine or in a Cartesian distinction from society (Nature), nor as wholly
constructed, humanized or hybrid (nature). Rather societies exist in a dialectic with material pro-
cesses that condition, but remain relatively autonomous from, human society; nature is able to pro-
pel itself and makes a difference – but can be disrupted and does not ‘act’ (Malm, 2018, p. 199). At
the same time – crucially – this dialectic is simultaneously intertwined with international dynamics
arising from the coexistence of multiple societies.
The first section assesses existing attempts to re-think nature and IR arguing that new materialist
and post-human approaches, unlike traditional geopolitics, engage with human-nature enmeshment
and legitimately aim to counter humanist exceptionalism. Ultimately, however, they lack tools for
grasping the importance of the international for the politics of nature (and vice versa). Secondly, I
argue Rosenberg’s re-theorization of the international as societal multiplicity fails to acknowledge
the inherent metabolism between societies and nature that inflect such inter-societal interaction.
Third, the implications for IR of a socio-ecological international theory are probed first by reconsi-
dering the five ‘consequences of societal multiplicity’ that Rosenberg sets forward (2016) and then via
observations on how climate change is more than a collective action issue requiring international
regimes and global governance. Rather, it originates from – and deeply affects – the agents, structure
and strategies of the international system itself.
2. The matter of the international
In IR, as in other social sciences, the dramatic human imprint on natural systems has unavoidably
highlighted links between nature and society. Such links are obscured by a Cartesian dualism that
supposes the two are ontologically and functionally separate. Those reviving the Geopolitics tra-
dition emphasize that physical distance, for example, still matters (Porter, 2015) or more broadly
posit that ‘geography is the backdrop to human history itself’ (Kaplan, 2013, p. 28) – but remain
largely silent on the converse importance of human history for geography. Their ‘nature’ is a ‘rela-
tively stable foundation’ on which ‘the pyramid of national power arises’ as Morgenthau had it
(1948/1985, p. 165). Famously, for Spykman, ‘Ministers come and go, even dictators die, but moun-
tain ranges stand unperturbed’ (1938, p. 29). The ‘human’ of Geopolitics is similarly ahistorical.
Human nature harbours desires and instincts (Solomon, 2012) seemingly untouched by different
historical social formations. Technology such as ships, bridges or airplanes modify geographical con-
straints, but there is no attempt in the new Geopolitics to grasp how human groups and natures are
mutually entangled.
In contrast, diverse ideas subsumed under the label ‘new materialism’ (Connolly, 2013) have been
taken up by IR scholars with the purpose of recognizing precisely the interconnections of human and
non-human elements and the fungibility of ‘nature’. Giant infrastructures and other assembled or
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hybrid human/non-human entities are recognized as significant or even as ‘agents’ in international
affairs (Acuto & Curtis, 2013; Mayer & Acuto, 2015; Voelkner, 2011). Other efforts to avoid huma-
nist exceptionalism and anthropocentrism adopt a ‘posthuman’ stance, exploring how non-human
life and non-life have real impacts and/or moral value (Cudworth & Hobden, 2017; Walters, 2014).
Some extend rights and properties normally considered only to apply to humans to animals (e.g.
wolves) and other organisms (microbes) on the basis of either their similarity to humans in terms
of creating borders or territories (Du Plessis, 2018; Youatt, 2014) or mutual vulnerability between
humans and those life-forms (Kavalski & Zolkos, 2016). Audra Mitchell advances the idea of ‘worlds’
as the objects of struggles over security, encompassing animal, geographical, technical, cultural as
well as human elements (2014).
To transcend the human/non-human divide, notions such as ‘hybridity’ and ‘assemblage’ cast
nature and society as functionally merged and/or as indistinguishable in terms of both ontology
and properties. A key thinker such as Jane Bennett (2010) aims to ‘minimise’ the differences between
subjects and objects (Cudworth & Hobden, 2017, p. 66) while another inspiration, Bruno Latour,
draws on the Deleuzian term ‘assemblage’ to capture how technological, human and non-human
elements are contingently formed and reformed into objects. These can even become ‘actants’:
‘(u)nder the principle of “generalised ontological symmetry” different kinds of entities (humans
and nonhumans) are involved in relational productive activities’ (Balzacq & Cavelty, 2016, p. 183).
Such approaches recognize in ethically appealing ways that humans are immersed in wider net-
works of life and non-life. However, if in the Anthropocene human-nonhuman hybrids are all there
is, and assemblages of diverse types of ontology combine to ‘act’, this distributes power and respon-
sibility correspondingly widely. At times agency is seemingly equated with causal effect (making a
difference): ‘any thing that modifies a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor’ (Latour,
2005, p. 71). Latour speaks of kettles as ‘actants’, because they can cause water to be boiled, for
example (leading Andreas Malm to ask whether fossil fuels are to blame for burning (see Malm,
2018, p. 81)). If assemblages of human and non-human matter are the agents of history, how do
notions such as ‘anthropogenic climate change’, and ‘environmental destruction’ remain meaning-
ful? If there is no (longer) a distinction between human and natural, can one be said to encroach
upon the other? The overwhelming power (and responsibility) held by ‘humans’, at the very moment
when their impact is greatest, becomes harder to identify, as does the unleashed power of natural
systems with their own dynamics. Hybridism leaves scholars ‘pursuing an ontological flatland of
entanglements’ (Hamilton, 2017, p. 96).
An alternative is to maintain a distinction, albeit a dialectical rather than a Cartesian one (Saito,
2017). This zooms in on their interaction while not collapsing society and nature into one notion
such as ‘Oikos’ (Moore, 2015). A Cartesian division supposed that nature and society were made
of wholly different stuff: ‘substance dualism’. Materialists of all stripes subscribe to ‘substance mon-
ism’ (the belief that the social world also rests on the physical world), but dialectical materialists deny
that this necessarily implies ‘property monism’: that the social and physical world are cut from ‘one
cloth’ as hybridism supposes (see Malm, 2018, pp. 53–57). Social phenomena are ultimately based on
the same matter but have emergent properties that make them operate according to different logics
and processes. This in turn requires different types of disciplinary knowledge. Psychology may
emerge from chemical interactions but cannot be reduced to chemistry. Malm argues that historical
materialism has always insisted that human social relations are ‘unthinkable outside of nature [sub-
stance monism], but they also evince emergent properties different from that nature [… ] absolute
monism [of the new materialist type] rules out dialectics. Only property dualism can capture a dia-
lectics of society and nature’ (Malm, 2018, pp. 58–59). ‘Property monism’ would make figuring out
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the relation between them harder, not easier. All that can then be done is to identify contingent
hybrid assemblages.
In addition, the hybridism of new materialists works against recognizing the significance of the
international. Privileging connections, linkages and entanglements between systems and across bor-
ders and substances sits awkwardly with identifying inter-societal relations; that requires distinctions
between societies to be recognized and foregrounded. New materialists can countenance the assem-
bling of political spaces (‘territorialisation’) but these are by definition ephemeral: ‘assemblages
establish territories as they emerge and hold together but also constantly mutate, transform and
break up’ (Müller, 2015, p. 29). Gilles Deleuze theorized assemblages as multiplicities themselves
– ones that ‘close themselves off from others, but this is never an absolute cut’ thanks to the ‘energies
and flows that ultimately show them to be an uninterrupted cloth’ (Harman, 2014, p. 124). Latour’s
‘assemblages last for only an instant, perishing in favour of a closer successor that is not, strictly
speaking, the same assemblage’ (Harman, 2014, p. 125). With Latour’s approach ‘all the well-
known structures of society are suddenly nowhere to be found; instead, we now find concrete
relations of humans and non-humans acting together’ (Krarup & Blok, 2011, p. 43) in laboratories,
offices, hospitals, etc. If they ‘act together’, always locally, how can consequences of different societies
being apart be spotted? Latour appears stumped and disinterested in the international (‘I don’t know
what a “nation” is, or “international”. I’m not sure what they mean’ (quoted in Salter & Walters,
2016, pp. 252–253)) preferring other units of analysis such as critical zones – ‘sort of water catch-
ments, basically’ (quoted in Salter & Walters, 2016, pp. 252–253). Latour also rejects the notion
of sovereignty, something he understands to mean ‘impenetrability’ (2016, p. 311), which would
make the idea of interaction between units nigh impossible.
Others recognize some of these problems and deploy complexity theory instead, arguing that the
international system and natural systems comprise a ‘panarchy’ of co-evolving systems and sub-sys-
tems (Hobden, 2015, p. 178). Erika Cudworth and Steve Hobden stress ‘the bodied nature of the
human and our bedding in vital networks with other beings and things’ (2017, p. 137) and have
suggested a ‘complex ecologism’ as a remedy. Unlike the hybridists, they maintain ‘analytical separ-
ation between social and natural systems’ (2013, p. 7) but advance a complexity-based critique of
anthropocentrism and linear models of change in existing IR theorists such as Waltz, Wendt and
Wallerstein. What remains less clear is what the international specifically contributes to analysis
of such complex human-nonhuman relations. At times, ‘the international’ is scarcely considered a
system in its own right: ‘What we call the international is a complex interweave of numerous systems
nested, intersected and embedded in each other’ (Cudworth & Hobden, 2013, p. 75). The aim is to
understand this ‘complex interweave’ by ‘developing an understanding of social, political economic
relations as impacting beyond the human’ (Cudworth & Hobden, 2013, p. 68) – but seemingly with-
out specifying how the international affects that complexity. Complexity theory challenges the ‘tra-
ditional IR’ assumption of there being one single reality, we are told, suggesting instead ‘multiple
realities’ (Kavalski, 2007, p. 446), but then the existence of a multiplicity of societal entities becomes
a difficult notion to sustain. Other post-humanist efforts to alert International Relations to dynamics
beyond human entities, to microbes or packs of wolves for example, highlight usefully that borders
and territories, and interaction between groups, are not processes unique to humans (Du Plessis,
2018; Youatt, 2014). Some similar dynamics may even play out between distinct groups of non-
humans (and between them and human groups), but this surely presupposes a theory of the conse-
quences of multiplicity. If IR is jettisoned, where will such theories come from?
To illustrate this critique, it may be instructive to briefly examine The Planet Politics Manifesto
(Burke et al., 2016; see also Harrington & Shearing, 2017) which appeals to posthuman and new
GLOBALIZATIONS 423
materialist ideas, attempting to replace ‘the international’ with ‘the planet’ as the primary ontology of
the discipline of IR. Placing the ‘collective human interaction with the biosphere’ front and centre,
Planet Politics authors lampoon IR’s state-based and ‘anthropocentric ontology’ (Burke et al., 2016,
p. 513). For them, hybrid ‘social-nature’ in the Anthropocene has acquired quasi-agency: the planet
is ‘a power’ forcing ‘us’ to think again and take action (Burke et al., 2016, p. 513). A planetary ontol-
ogy is advanced that does not seek to set IR on a new footing but, in their own words, undoes ‘Inter-
national Relations, as both a system of knowledge and institutional practice’ (Burke et al., 2016, p.
501). Their aim is to dissolve the paradigm of the international, replacing it with the Anthropocene
worldview of planetary crisis. In the Manifesto, the planet is the ‘real’ that presses itself upon us,
while the international is an outdated and dangerously illusory paradigm:
the global ecological crisis ‘has torn a giant hole in the fabric of our understanding’; [… ] it is a vast ‘tear
in the real’. Now our paradigms fail the real. International Relations, as both a system of knowledge and
institutional practice, is undone by the reality of the planet [… ] International Relations has failed
because the planet does not match and cannot be clearly seen by its institutional and disciplinary frame-
works. Institutionally and legally, it is organised around a managed anarchy of nation-states, not the col-
lective human interaction with the biosphere. (Burke et al., 2016, p. 501)
Critics of theManifesto have been quick to point out that, despite the anti-IR proclamations it inad-
vertently resurrects global liberal IR, falling back on solutions in which states, experts, institutions
and international law enact a global governance regime (Chandler, Cudworth, & Hobden, 2018,
p. 195). However, the Manifesto is nonetheless typical of planetary governance approaches in that
it inserts a singular ‘we’ into the context of the largest biophysical system (‘the planet’) (Burke
et al., 2016, p. 507) and replaces IR’s paradigm with Earth Systems Science’s physical and globalist
concepts, e.g. ‘the atmosphere’, ‘global greenhouse emissions’ or ‘a world of melted ice caps’ (Burke
et al., 2016, p. 500). This planetary and post-human framing allows the Manifesto to dismiss the
international as ‘unreal’, clearing the way for imagined globalist governance. It is also telling that
critics of the Manifesto do not generally challenge the hybridist idea that the human and non-
human are indistinct (Chandler et al., 2018, p. 205). Also citing Latour, they concur that IR as a dis-
cipline will ‘have little if anything to do with [saving the planet]’ (Chandler et al., 2018, p. 207).
Chandler et al. point to the ‘need to re-enact the relationship between economy and ecology’ and
to construct ‘posthuman communities’ (2018, p. 206), but, again, do not address how the inter-
national might inflect that relationship nor such communities. IR is abandoned in favour of the
planetary.
The unhappy outcome of all this is that while IR remains essentially limited to the reductive Geo-
politics view concerning the role of the non-human world as a stage for human group conflict, the
new materialists, drawing ad hoc from Earth Systems Science, embrace hybridism and process mon-
ism, occluding the importance of the international.
3. Re-grounding IR for the Anthropocene
Rather than looking to natural sciences or Science and Technology Studies (STS) to find a new ‘real’
outside itself, IR requires a theory of the international that includes non-human nature without col-
lapsing the societal into it. Justin Rosenberg argues that IR has been hobbled as a discipline by never
positively articulating what its unique subject matter is, effectively becoming a sub-discipline of
Political Science focused on the residual category of ‘political power (operating in the absence of cen-
tral authority) rather than an ontology of the international per se’ (Rosenberg, 2016, p. 131). IR
424 O. CORRY
theorists ‘have asked “what is international politics as a subset of politics in general?” rather than
“what is the international as a dimension of the social world?”’ (Rosenberg, 2017, p. 92). This has
led to widespread ‘internalism’ in social analysis (the assumption that development in a society
can be explained by factors internal to that society), confusion as to whether IR covers more than
international politics, and the bizarre idea that domestic and international should be treated as dis-
tinct and separate spheres. The latter became almost discipline-defining despite being obviously
empirically false (Waltz, 1979). Ambitiously, Rosenberg takes up Kenneth Waltz’ challenge to devise
a unified theory of international and domestic politics – a ‘social theory of the international’ (2006) –
bringing all the implications of the international to light, including those that play out and originate
inside societies and beyond.
The key concept charged with doing all this is, as mentioned, societal multiplicity. Just as all social
life has a temporal aspect (the subject-matter of History) and a spatial aspect (studied by Geogra-
phy), the social has always had an international dimension since the arrival of co-existing multiple
societies (and this should be the subject matter of IR):
multiplicity entails the existence of a many-sided inter-societal domain which cannot be fully compre-
hended by theories drawn from the analysis of ‘society’ in the singular; and, on the other hand, this same
universal fact plays a deep and continuous role in the internal constitution of domestic societies them-
selves, extending the significance of the international into the subject matter of the other social sciences
and humanities. (Rosenberg, 2017, pp. 90–91)
This theorization of the international has been met with a host of probing questions concerning
grand theory, coloniality, disciplinarity and the political (Blaney & Tickner, 2017; Brooks, 2017;
Davenport, 2013; Jackson, 2017). But what, if anything, is expressed or implied concerning the natu-
ral world (Corry, 2018)? Rosenberg is explicit that it is about the organization of humans in distinct
groups and its many consequences: ‘we know from history that human societies have always been
multiple’ (2016, p. 137, emphasis added).
This is perfectly in line with most IR and social science in general in which a Cartesian division
renders the relations between human and non-human both invisible and unproblematic. Despite
notable exceptions (Deudney, 1999, 2000), Stephen Hobden is right to argue that IR has been ‘a dee-
ply anthropocentric discipline’ and has, at best, ‘viewed environmental questions through a pre-
existing framework’ (2015, p. 169). Rosenberg’s ‘societal multiplicity’ understood as multiple
human groups does little to disturb such anthropocentric slumbers. However, it could yet facilitate
a way forward.
While not concerned with anthropocentrism, Rosenberg’s theory of multiplicity is not devoid of
reference to the natural world. As a historical materialist, Rosenberg has explained the emergence of
unevenness and multiplicity in the world in terms of geographical variation that provided different
ecological niches. When early humans left Africa and spread out across the continents in the Pleis-
tocene, they inhabited radically different climates and had to adapt differently, creating basic con-
ditions for different rates and directions of development (Rosenberg, 2010, p. 180): ‘multiple
societies must vary in their geographical location. And they are therefore differently influenced
both by the physical variation of the earth itself, and by the unique relational position that each
occupies with respect to all the others’ (Rosenberg, 2016, p. 137). Unevenness not only descriptively
characterizes
the overall process of human social development at every point in historical time; but also the socio-eco-
logical bases of human subsistence are such (grounded as they are in creative adaptation to a varied natu-
ral world) that it necessarily does so. (Rosenberg, 2006, p. 318, emphasis added)
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But Rosenberg’s ecological niche-argument (like classical Geopolitics) stops short. His arrow of caus-
ality goes only from geography to societies. In addition, only the local ecology immediately sur-
rounding each society is deemed to matter. Today societies not only react to and mold their local
geographies but draw on, react to and transform nature in far-flung corners of the world, e.g. via
conquest, trade and effluents carried in global Earth systems. This is not captured by an adap-
tation-to-ecological-niches argument.
However, Rosenberg’s own roots in historical materialism open up a more sophisticated take that
is available neither to rationalist IR nor most reflectivist IR. In a historical materialist vein ‘societal’ is
not something separate from nature that requires materiality to be added to it. Rather, society is
inherently bound up with nature, since human and non-human nature are envisaged to be necess-
arily in a dialectical relation. Long regarded as deeply anthropocentric, canonical works of the his-
torical materialist tradition have recently been re-examined, uncovering in some cases a surprisingly
deep concern with ecology and human dependence on it (Foster, 2000; Saito, 2017; Schmidt, 1971).
As with new materialism, for older materialism (as set out by Marx and others) humans were sen-
sing, living beings, who are necessarily and originally part of nature (‘That man’s (sic) physical and
spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked with itself, for man is part of
nature’ (Marx, 1958, p. 31)). Similarly to those now advocating ecological limits or planetary bound-
aries, Marx was concerned with soil depletion and, more generally, emphasized that, faced with the
necessity to produce the means to survive by engaging practically with and modifying non-human
nature, humans are forced to take the independent properties (and limitations) of nature into
account. Human aims are for Marx ‘not just limited by history and society but equally by the struc-
ture of matter itself’ (Schmidt, 1971, p. 63). A ‘metabolism’ (Stoffwechsel) between humans and non-
human nature was for Marx at the heart of the origins and shapes of different historical societal pro-
cesses. Labour and the exploitation of it was, of course, central to his famous critique of political
economy. But ‘[l]abor is […] a process between man and nature, a process by which man […] med-
iates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature’ (Foster, Clark, & York,
2011, p. 400). Nature as well as society are in this conception historical and dialectically related:
‘the production of life […] appears as a two-fold relation. On the one hand as a natural, and the
other as a social relation’ (Marx, 1949, p. 38). For Foster et al., in dialectical materialism ‘Labor
and production constituted the active human transformation of nature, but also of human nature,
the human relation to nature and of human beings themselves’ (2011, p. 228).
Although interaction between human and non-human elements is the base of historical materi-
alist ideas about ‘society’, it does not collapse the two sides into each other. This allows us to see how
different societal formations involve very different metabolisms, i.e. ‘regulatory processes that govern
the interchange of materials’ (Clark & Foster, 2009, p. 313) and different constellations of technology
(humanized nature). ‘Metabolism’ can be traced back to German physiologists’ studies of respiration
in the 1830s, but for Marx it captured usefully ‘the complex, interdependent process linking human
beings to nature through labour’ (Foster, 2000, p. 158) and allowed his ecological critique of capit-
alism as a social order that created a ‘rift’ or unsustainable imbalance with non-human nature.
Thus, in a vein that would not seem out of place in post-humanist discourse Marx noted that the
social and natural were necessarily intertwined. Yet for him they were becoming progressively
more distinct with the emerging rift in the metabolism: ‘(i)t is not the unity of living and active
humanity with the natural, inorganic conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature […]
which requires explanation […] but rather the separation between these inorganic conditions of
human existence’ (Marx, 1857/1973, p. 489).
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The argument that labour provides the original intersection between nature and humans has an
economistic twang to it, since human existence requires more than economic production for survival.
But ‘labour’ should be understood expansively to include more than production of consumer goods.
Labour as production can also be supplemented by the argument that other social modes such as that
of protection are equally fundamental to human group existence and similarly conditioned by
material factors (Deudney, 2000). Daniel Deudney suggests ‘historical security materialism’, asking
how ‘changing forces of destruction (constituted by geography and technology) condition the viabi-
lity of different modes of protection (understood as clusters of security practices)’ (2000, p. 80).
Thus, in a materialist tradition, societies at their very root emerge in a metabolic exchange with
nature in the collective pursuit of needs including food, shelter and security. ‘Metabolism’maintains
a relative autonomy of both parts while emphasizing an ongoing exchange in which both are poten-
tially maintained and changed. Saito calls this ‘non-Cartesian dualism’ (2017). Unlike hybrids and
‘intermingling’ metaphors, a metabolism occurs between distinct spheres and can break down, an
example of which Marx describes in terms of the agricultural nutrient cycle in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Marx followed with concern how yields fell as industrial practices meant that organic matter
was not being returned to the land and instead was transported to distant cities where it amassed
as waste and pollution. The ‘metabolic rift’ was produced. Brett Clack and Richard York likewise
describe a rift in the global carbon cycle in the twentieth century (2005) the logics of economic
expansion and ecological reproduction collide to produce excess carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
Tellingly, however, this discussion is falling into the internalist traps of considering ‘society’ and
‘nature’ in the singular, ‘humans’ as one species agent, etc.
4. Society, nature and multiplicity
The materialist notion of a human-nature metabolism has proved useful for re-materializing the idea
of ‘society’. But Rosenberg points out that the classical social theorists, Marx among them, were
internalists, tending ‘at a deep theoretical level, to conceptualize society in the singular’, and failed
to systematically ‘theorize the consequences of multiplicity for social reality’ (2016, p. 140). Simply
rematerializing a notion of society does not deal with internalism, just as restating the importance of
societal multiplicity does not tackle human-nature Cartesianism. Kamran Matin notes that Marx’s
double relationship between nature and society becomes a triple relationship if the international
is added, but that this requires a ‘radical revision of historical materialism that Marx did not
carry out but which is surely long overdue’ (Matin 2013, p. 154).
I expand upon facets of a societal-natural notion of multiplicity in the following by considering
Rosenberg’s five consequences of societal multiplicity – coexistence, difference, interaction, combi-
nation and dialectical change (2017, pp. 135–141) – in the light of the above.
Firstly, for Rosenberg coexistence of multiple societies is what ‘generates the international itself as
a dimension of the social world’ (2016, p. 136) and it is the political that generates societal multi-
plicity by dividing the world into multiple units. This grants ‘central importance to political multi-
plicity’ (2016, p. 135) but without limiting the effects of multiplicity to just politics, as every sphere of
the social – from cooking to crime – is affected by it. But with an ecological-materialist theory the
formation of seperate societies can be linked not just to a non-material ‘political’ dimension but also
to certain natural factors and how groups interact with them. A classical paper argued that war,
usually involved in (proto-)state formation to protect surpluses and elites’ privileges, generated
state-formation only under quite specific ecological conditions – ones where losing tribes could
not escape and relocate (Carneiro, 1970). Where natural barriers or concentration of abundant
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sources of food existed, e.g. in a valley or along a river, vanquished groups were forced or induced to
stay and be subjugated by victors. Under such conditions, state-like structures arose as victors
policed and controlled others in stratified social arrangements and gradually over greater areas
that then had to be defended. Michael Mann (1986) and others1 have more complex accounts of
the rise of modern states, but here too a multiplicity (of states) emerges out of political processes
involving also material conditions and the political economy of financing and maintaining them
(Earle, 1997, p. 70). Multiplicity has, at base, a material component.
Related to this, the second consequence of societal multiplicity is that societies are not just mul-
tiple but necessarily different. Here the ecological niche argument reappears: societies are ‘differently
influenced both by the physical variation of the earth itself, and by the unique relational position that
each occupies with respect to all the others’ (Rosenberg, 2016, p. 137). With a materialist approach to
multiplicity, however, domestic natures (those contained within societal boundaries) are also chan-
ged via the metabolism with those different societies. A European feudal society in the 1500s affected
nature differently from how a Singaporean one does in the twenty-first century. Transformations in
domestic natures may result inadvertently but also deliberately via grand infrastructure projects,
landscaping and deliberate re-engineering of nature, e.g. Soviet irrigation of farmlands resulted in
the disappearance of the Aral Sea. Settler colonial projects purposefully transform landscapes,
flora and fauna (Crosby, 2004), and even engineer and divert underground water resources
(Weizman, 2007). Coexistence of multiple such different socio-natures then affects how each devel-
ops internally. Nature is multiple and different in each society, therefore, not simply because of
the original unevenness of the Earth, but because of the multiplicity of modes of production and
protection. In some cases, ecological boundaries are so stark as to be visible from space; studies
have shown that the ‘greenness’ of a territory follows country boundaries (Chen et al., 2019)
(although societies are not always coterminous with territories).
A third consequence of multiplicity for Rosenberg is interaction because all societies ‘confront the
fact that the human world extends – both quantitatively and qualitatively – beyond themselves’ with
all the dangers and opportunities that that entails (Rosenberg, 2016, p. 137). Interaction is the staple
content of IR: ‘inter-societal conflict, diplomacy, organization, law and exchanges of all kinds’
(Rosenberg, 2016, p. 137); but it is only ‘half-known’ to us under the ‘negative sign’ of the absence
of global authority rather than the ‘positive sign’ of the co-presence of multiple societies (Rosenberg,
2016, p. 136). Through a materialist lens, each society emerges from and is sustained by its own par-
ticular ecological niche, but also, due to the international, interacts with multiple other socio-natural
entities (including their natures). International trade in finished goods is at staggering levels, but
trade in raw materials hides the fact that use of ‘nondomestic resources is, on average, about three-
fold larger than the physical quantity of traded goods’ (Wiedmann et al. 2015, p. 6271). In studies of
world politics, ecological imperialism (defined as ‘the growth of the center of the system at unsus-
tainable rates, through the more thoroughgoing ecological degradation of the periphery’ (Foster
et al., 2011, p. 371)) has ‘scarcely been visible’ (Clark & Foster, 2009, p. 312) compared to military,
economic and cultural imperialism. A growing literature exists on unequal exchange (e.g. Hornborg,
2012) albeit often in terms of a ‘world system’ and an ‘Earth system’ (Hornborg & Crumley, 2016)
rather than an international system.
The fourth effect of multiplicity is combination (Rosenberg, 2016, pp. 138–139). Influences and
impulses from coexistence with other societies necessarily combine with existing domestic structures
and ‘(a)ll societies must therefore be ongoing combinations of local patterns of development with
external influences and pressures of all kinds’ (Rosenberg, 2016, p. 138). Rosenberg points to the
English spoken in Britain as a combination of Roman, Saxon, Viking and Norman languages as
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an example. But also the ecological niches that societies occupy must be combinations. Domestic
natures are not unchangingly pristine. They are themselves a result of a local metabolic exchange
combined with what the international has wrought, e.g. importing of new modes of production or
protection, but also natural resources and flora and fauna imported/exported directly leading to
natural accumulation/depletion.
The final, fifth effect of societal multiplicity is summed up by Rosenberg as dialectical change:
‘exchanges among social formations unlock new possibilities and departures through mechanisms
that are intrinsic to the phenomenon of interaction itself’ (2016, p. 139). The international imparts
‘its own dialectical mechanisms and dynamics to the structure of world history’ (2016, p. 139,
emphasis added). Anarchy as a structure is claimed by realists to compel all states to be function-
ally alike (Waltz, 1979) but Rosenberg argues multiplicity ensures perpetually unique societal
formations via interaction and combination that in turn generate shifting structures in the system,
such as the creation and spread of regional city-states systems, European empires, the modern
system of nation-states, bi-polarity, world empire, etc. In a plundered international reading of
‘dialectical exchanges’ humans and nature are in one metabolism, but each socio-natural entity
is also in a metabolic exchange with other entities through the international. This double dialectic
produces social structures in the international which have a structuring effect on natural systems –
that impinge back on individual societies and their structural arrangements. Empire is heavily
bound up with uneven ecological exchange and ‘development’ is a function of domestic politics,
international pressures and a ‘rift’ in the metabolism with regional ecologies and, now, entire
Earth systems.
A classic example of socio-ecological international dialectical change is the story of the inter-
national guano trade (Foster et al., 2011, pp. 354–359). The industrial agricultural practices deprived
soils of nutrients previously routinely returned to the land, prized people from the countryside and
left urban centres polluted and overcrowded. Low yields then squeezed profits incentivizing chemists
to discover that guano could act as a fast-working fertilizer, instantly boosting production and
profits. An international ‘guano rush’ ensued where European merchants (backed by states) plun-
dered deposits that had taken thousands of years to accumulate, notably on particular Peruvian
islands. These were rapidly depleted, mined by Chinese labourers working in slave-like conditions.
This left local societies transformed, traders and elites enriched, migrant workers exploited (or dead)
and the ecology of the rocks unrecognizable and stripped. Bird and fish populations were decimated
and Spain and four South American countries went to war over control of the fertilizer trade (Foster
et al., 2011, pp. 364–365). A local metabolic rift in European societies had led to metabolic rifts in
distant socio-natural entities, and an international ‘rift’ between European and South American
societies. Today’s trade in artificial fertilizers, effectively converting oil sourced in the Middle East
and Venezuela into agricultural production (food) for the West, is part of the global metabolic
rift in the carbon cycle causing climate change.
5. Climate of the international
Climate change may be the iconic issue of the ‘Anthropocene’, but the social structures implicated in
generating it are often glossed over, and scholarship and commentary have surprisingly rarely
‘grappled with how global climate change relates to the historical era of capitalism’ (Clark &
York, 2005, p. 395). IR with its abstraction from material processes within and between societies
has contributed to this, failing to deliver much beyond institutional perspectives to tackle the
free-rider problem among self-interested states. Similarly International Political Economy analysis
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of the environment ‘has remained largely focused on the treaties, institutions and regimes’ rather
than ‘the environmental implications of larger structural trends in the global political economy’
(Newell & Lane, 2017, p. 137).
Looking through an international social-ecological lens changes this in two basic ways related to
the origins and effects of climate change. On the one hand, while emissions accumulate globally,
multiplicity was at the heart of the emergence and spread of the specific historical set of social
relations that cause them. One key aspect of this has been captured by proponents of the ‘Capitalo-
cene’ concept who argue that it was not the species as such but a ‘tiny minority even in Britain’ who
were able via military and economic structures to establish and spread fossil-driven capitalist forms
of production: ‘a clique of white British men literally pointed steam-power as a weapon – on sea and
land, boats and rails – against the best part of humankind, from the Niger delta to the Yangzi delta,
the Levant to Latin America’ (Malm & Hornborg, 2014, pp. 63–64). The proliferation of fossil capital
in turn drove the spread of the modern international system, and the post-war ‘Great Acceleration’,
often depicted as a global process pushing Earth systems (including the climate) beyond critical
boundaries (Wijkman & Rockström, 2013), also involved a host of international dynamics.
Secondly, climate change in turn has wide implications for the international itself including (i) the
societal units that make up societal-ecological multiplicity, (ii) the structure in which those units
coexist, and (iii) the means and processes through which interaction occurs between the units.
(i) Climate change alters the units of the international. With a socio-natural conception of society,
altering the climate directly (but unevenly) alters the socio-natural metabolism and hence the
constitution of the multiple societies. This can be seen most baldly in terms of climate change
shifting physical boundaries and individual domestic ecologies forcing societies also to change.
Some countries such as Bangladesh are being inundated with salt water, while Vanuatu risks
disappearing completely. Others, like Russia or Greenland, may lose permafrost or sea ice
cover but gain access to sea routes and resources. This shifts power balances, but more subtly
climate additionally alters what it even means for units to be powerful or secure. Just four dec-
ades ago, the idea that large ‘carbon emissions’ – itself a construct to emerge out of international
processes and accounting practices – would be a source of leverage and influence in inter-
national bargaining forums would have seemed outlandish. A ‘big emitter’ such as the US
during the Kyoto negotiations in 1997 would have been a big prize to bring into the deal,
and serious concessions were made to try to achieve it. Conversely, climate vulnerability is
today a weakness, while being highly reliant on fossil fuels and other greenhouse gas contribu-
tors is a potential vulnerability factor if international climate politics were to lead to stranded
carbon assets. Ultimately, climate change mitigation casts a shadow over the future of the global
fossil economy, putting a question mark at the core of the mode of production and consump-
tion that shaped the modern international order, affecting also dynamics related to societal pro-
tection too (e.g. if previously strategic fossil fuel-rich regions lose their importance, or
geoengineering technologies have dual-use properties). Simply put, if the fossil economy
goes, the current international system goes with it.
(ii) Secondly, climate change is changing the structure of the international. This applies to changing
the distribution of power and patterns of allegiance, e.g. coalitions of small-island states or EU-
Chinese cooperation. Moreover, IR theory has typically theorized international structure as
solely related to the arrangement and relative power of principal subjects (usually states).
But, through socio-natural multiplicity optics such subjects are inherently bound up with
the material world. In geophysical terms a perturbed climate effectively becomes a new
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‘power’ itself with unpredictable, but potentially immense, destructive potential that societies
have to guard against. As Clive Hamilton puts it: ‘against the belief that “the world we will inha-
bit is the one we have made”, the world we will have to live with is the Earth we have turned
against us [… ] now, when Mother Earth opens her arms it is not to embrace but to crush us’
(2017, p. 48). In addition, dynamic weather patterns have over the past 40 years or so been ren-
dered into a distinct epistemic object of governance – ‘the climate’ (Corry, 2013a). A vast
machine of globalist infrastructure including sensors, satellites, computer models, theories,
scientists, NGOs and international institutions (see Edwards, 2010) has rendered the geophy-
sical processes into a geohistorical governance-object that can be known, measured, predicted
and, ultimately, operated on (Allan, 2016; Corry, 2013b). This process has its origins in inter-
national dynamics and cold war rivalries in particular while ideas such as ‘national carbon
sinks’ show how the climate object has itself been marked by the international (Lövbrand &
Stripple, 2006). Thus, while the climate is not an agent (understood as a conscious subject),
‘the climate’ as governance-object has become a major structuring force in world politics.
Actors claim a stake in it, define goals for it, intervene to steer or change it – or wish to prevent
others doing so. It is perhaps no coincidence that the biggest gathering of world leaders in his-
tory happened at the Paris climate negotiations in 2015. The global climate polity is a reality.
(iii) Climate change also alters how interaction takes place between socio-ecological units. Existing
modes of interaction change: new sea routes are being opened up in the Arctic, for example,
reconfiguring Arctic states and others. Human and non-human migration looks set to increase
as ecologies become hostile to human life. Attempts to deal with climate change also change
international interaction. The Clean Development Mechanism in the Kyoto protocol fostered
a new form of interaction whereby rich countries invested in lower carbon technologies in
poorer countries counting them instead of emissions reductions at home. Carbon governance
may at some point put an end to mass aviation. Even more dramatically, if solar geoengineering
technology is ever deployed to erect an artificial sun screen to lower average temperatures, this
would likely change existing international climate politics and struggles over ‘the global ther-
mostat’ would constitute a new form of interaction in the international (Corry, 2017b). Solar
geoengineering may open up new forms of war-making, legal innovations, sabotage or coun-
ter-geoengineering.
Patterns of interaction may also change. The classical patterns include balancing, buck-pas-
sing, divide and rule, institution-building and other forms of strategizing. The basic assumption
behind many of these is that there is operational independence between states, facilitating and
legitimating strategic action. Climate change potentially changes this by linking societies with
nature or dividing them in novel ways. The free-rider problem may continue to make global
cooperation difficult but if extreme climate change does end up constituting an ‘existential
risk’ threatening all societies or civilization in general (Bostrom & Cirkovic, 2011), this may
change. Existential risks put the classical IR debate about ‘relative gains’ versus ‘absolute gains’
into question, for example: if the losses from climate are near total and cover all units, then a rela-
tive gain becomes meaningless and free-riding unviable. On the other hand, societal multiplicity
guarantees differential vulnerabilities to climate change due to different socio-ecological positions
in the international system. This makes an existential ‘all in the same boat’ scenario in practice
unlikely and collective action dilemmasmay be exacerbated by heightened tensions andhostilities
caused by climate disruptions. In short, wemay say that climate complicates strategy, pittingKan-
tian ‘Climatic Peace Theory’ against a Hobbesian ‘Anthropocene Anarchy’.
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6. Conclusion
The nature of the international and the international structure of nature are both underappreciated
due to two sets of blinkers. IR specializes in understanding the implications of the fragmentation of
the world into multiple societies, but has in line with other social sciences bought into a Cartesian
view whereby its subject matter understood as social-in-kind is abstracted from entanglements with
nature, reducing the latter to a resource or an ‘environment’ to be managed. Meanwhile globalist
ecological epistemologies highlight human-nonhuman exchanges but view the world as essentially
one space, obscuring societal multiplicity. Both of these mutual blinkers have been compounded
by the epistemic weakness of IR as a discipline. This has allowed climate change to be viewed through
a (planetary) internalist lens, as an inherently global problem caused by and affecting all humans and
requiring global agreements. Despite increasingly dramatic accelerating climatic upheavals, inter-
national politics is assumed to be unaffected in its basic units and logics and processes.
Into this breach, new materialists seek to sensitize IR to material intermingling between humans,
technology and nature. Historical or dialectical materialists emphasize the metabolism between
natural and social processes. But neither has considered the simultaneous consequences of the inter-
national. The existence of global environmental systems that are becoming perturbed to a degree that
threatens survival of some or all societies is an important and urgent truth that the Planetary Politics
manifesto authors are right to highlight. Yet they are wrong to claim that this renders the inter-
national itself a mirage, superseded by the planetary ‘real’. With Rosenberg’s theory of the inter-
national, the idea of ‘humans’ as a singular force of nature can be corrected, highlighting that
multiplicity fragments humanity. But with a materialist rendition of societal multiplicity we must
also, while acknowledging the idea of ‘global nature’, point out that this too is fragmented by the
existence of a multiplicity of societies, each in a metabolic exchange with its environment. A meta-
bolic rift in the carbon cycle is partly driven by the international and through this rift, the climate
itself is international.
Note
1. Other factors such as kinship have been argued to play a role in facilitating ‘ethnogenesis’ or the for-
mation of units of social cohesion – ethnos – partly via endogamy – restriction of marriage within
the tribe, although Francis Fukuyama recently pointed to the importance to state building of methods
of weakening kinship allowing wider reaching allegiances to be fostered (2011).
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